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507 
THE SCOPE OF “PLAINTIFFS’ HARM” IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Deep sea adventurer and advocate Jacques Cousteau once stated: ―The 
happiness of the bee and the dolphin is to exist. For man it is to know that 
and to wonder at it.‖1 An environmental enthusiast might consider this 
statement a testimonial for wildlife‘s ―right to exist.‖ Those less keen on a 
broad reading of animal rights might argue that it buttresses the claim that 
animals‘ right to exist depends upon humans‘ desire to enjoy that 
existence.
2
 As the dominant earth species, Homo sapiens have power over 
the fate of weaker beings—power that is harnessed by environmental 
legislation. While animal rights laws have existed in rudimentary form 
since the third century BC, major wildlife protection legislation first 
appeared in the United States in the early 1970s.
3
 With thousands of 
species facing extinction, Congress enacted legislation protecting the plant 
and animal life of our ecosystem. Laws such as the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973 (ESA)
4
 and the National Environmental Protection Act of 
1969 (NEPA)
5
 have made great strides in shielding vulnerable wildlife. 
Judicial restrictions on civil environmental litigation, however, confine the 
focus of lawsuits to the aesthetic, recreational, and scientific needs of 
 
 
 1. Gerald Jonas, Jacques Cousteau, Oceans’ Impresario, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/26/world/jacques-cousteau-oceans-impresario-dies. 
html. Cousteau‘s son, Jean-Michael Cousteau, was one of the plaintiffs in the Winter case discussed in 
this Note. Settlement Agreement, Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, No. 06-CV-4131 (C.D. 
Cal. July 7, 2006);Temporary Restraining Order at 1, Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, No. 
06-CV-4131 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2006). 
 2. See Ian Tomb, The Legal Perspective on Animal Rights, in PEOPLE, PROPERTY, OR PETS? 60 
(Marc D. Hauser et al. eds., 2006) for a discussion of the multiple perspectives from which society 
views animals‘ right to life. 
 3. As early as the third century BC, the edicts of King Ashoka of India advocated vegetarianism 
and Buddhist perspectives on the treatment of animals, though the Law of Draco hinted at animal 
rights as early as the seventh century BC. See Animal Rights Timeline: Antiquity, ANIMAL RIGHTS 
HISTORY, http://www.animalrightshistory.org/timeline-antiquity.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). Greco-
Roman mythology of the third century AD also included stories of Triptolemus and his support for 
animal welfare. See id. Modern environmental legislation such as the Clean Air Act was enacted in the 
1950s, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006) (originally enacted as the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, 
ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955)), but significant animal rights legislation emerged two decades later, with 
the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969 and the Endangered Species Act in 
1973. See infra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 4. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
 5. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2006). 
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humans, rather than the common underlying motivation for such 
litigation—the desire to curtail wildlife harm and destruction.6 
In 2008, in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
7
 the Supreme 
Court vacated a preliminary injunction that had prevented the Navy‘s use 
of active sonar emission in breeding grounds and migratory routes of 
thousands of bottlenose dolphins, beaked whales, and other marine 
mammals. The Winter decision made several significant changes to legal 
standards, most of which have been addressed by scholars and subsequent 
lower court rulings.
8
 An aspect of the Winter opinion thus far neglected by 
scholars, however, lies in what the majority failed to address. The Winter 
Court bypassed an opportunity to establish a clear standard for whether 
animal harm should be considered within the scope of ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖9 
under the test for preliminary injunctions in civil environmental litigation. 
Indeed, the majority opinion may have confused courts further by tacitly 
adopting the restrictive minority definition of the scope of ―plaintiffs‘ 
harm‖ in dicta.10 
This Note begins by exploring the reasons that human advocates 
initiate litigation on behalf of animals and by describing the wildlife 
protection statutes and citizen suit provisions that help them do so. Part II 
discusses judicial ambiguity as to whether the scope of ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ 
in preliminary injunction analysis for civil environmental disputes 
includes only the harm to the human plaintiff with standing, the harm to 
the animal whose injury is often the underlying motivation for litigation, 
or the harm to both. Part III analyzes the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Winter and the majority‘s implicit exclusion of injury to marine mammals 
from the scope of ―plaintiffs‘ harm.‖ Finally, Part IV offers three 
approaches to clarify the definition of ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ within the 
standing doctrine and the test for preliminary injunctions: Courts could 
maintain the current standing doctrine and, in preliminary relief analysis, 
define ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ only as the harm to the human with standing; 
they could maintain the current standing doctrine but consider both the 
 
 
 6. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 7. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
 8. The Winter court (1) expounded a new standard within the test for preliminary injunctions of 
a ―likelihood‖ of irreparably injury (rather than the mere ―possibility‖ standard used by the Ninth 
Circuit), (2) disregarded prior pro-environment presumptions under NEPA, and (3) permitted the 
executive branch to supersede the enforcement of court-imposed restraining orders when national 
security is a consideration. See id. 
 9. I place ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ in quotation marks in recognition that the definition of ―plaintiffs‖ 
and what constitutes their ―harm‖ in environmental controversies is subject to differing interpretations. 
See infra Parts II.B, II.D, and IV. 
 10. See infra note 132.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/5
  
 
 
 
 
2010] THE SCOPE OF ―PLAINTIFFS‘ HARM‖ 509 
 
 
 
 
human harm and harm to animals in preliminary relief analysis; or (more 
radically) they could give animals standing to sue in their own right, 
dispose of the pretense of human injury, and consider only the animals‘ 
harm in determining the appropriateness of a preliminary injunction. This 
Note suggests that the second approach is most realistic and appropriate, 
as it offers a parallel between constitutional standing and preliminary 
injunction analysis and also aligns with public policy supporting wildlife 
protection.  
II. CIVIL SUITS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND WILDLIFE PROTECTION 
A. Environmental and Wildlife Protection Statutes 
In the United States, animals retain property status.
11
 In most states, if a 
family pet is injured by a third party, the family can recover only the fair 
market value of the animal less its depreciation in value since the date of 
purchase.
12
 Monetary recovery for the accidental loss of a beloved kitten 
might be limited to twenty dollars, without regard to the owner‘s 
emotional attachment.
13
 Of course, the pet has no right of its own to sue its 
assailant. No one other than the pet‘s legal owner has standing to sue when 
the animal is injured, and the only damages the owner could receive are 
for the conversion of property.
14
 
The avenues of recovery expand, however, when a federal statute 
provides protection over a particular species of wild animal, such as the 
endangered bald eagle or chimpanzee.
15
 Many of these federal 
environmental statutes include citizen suit provisions awarding the public 
special power to sue on behalf of threatened animals, despite lacking 
ownership.
16
 
 
 
 11. GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 4 (1995). 
 12. See id. at 51. 
 13. See DAVID S. FAVRE, ANIMAL LAW: WELFARE, INTERESTS, AND RIGHTS 327 (2008) (―One 
category of human that can clearly sue about legal harm to an animal is the owner of an animal. As an 
owner of an animal, it is not the pain of the animal that is the harm; rather, it is the harm to the human 
property interests that is at issue. . . . However, in no jurisdiction at the moment may Sally be 
considered to have standing to sue for the pain and suffering of the cat. . . . [O]nly a state prosecutor 
has that standing.‖); see also FRANCIONE, supra note 11, at 4–5; David Hambrick, A Legal Argument 
against Animals as Property, in PEOPLE, PROPERTY, OR PETS? 55, 55–57 (Marc D. Hauser et al. eds., 
2006). 
 14. ―[T]he law of standing assumes that humans cannot have legally significant relationships 
with animals owned by others.‖ FRANCIONE, supra note 11, at 66. 
 15. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (2009). 
 16. See, e.g., Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006); 
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 
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The ESA is one of the most well known of these environmental 
statutes. Its purpose is to protect the earth and its animals, which have 
―esthetic, ecological, educational, recreational, and scientific value to our 
Nation and its people.‖17 The ESA requires the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service of the U.S. Department of the Interior to list and categorize species 
it considers to be endangered, threatened, or of concern.
18
 These species 
are afforded special limited protection from harm, harassment, and capture 
(―takings‖).19 
Like the ESA, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) prohibits 
harmful activity affecting endangered or depleted species of marine 
mammals (including dolphins, seals, sea lions, whales, and polar bears).
20
 
The MMPA affords slightly less protection than the ESA by permitting a 
wider range of adverse human activity.
21
 The Coastal Zone Management 
Act (CZMA) was similarly implemented to protect the nation‘s coasts, 
fish, wildlife, and natural characteristics, as well as humans‘ ecological, 
commercial, and recreational interests in those objects.
22
 The CZMA 
grants states significant power to implement legislation to protect and 
administer the state‘s coastline.23 
Another major vehicle for environment protection is the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which addresses actions of the federal 
government that may adversely affect the environment.
24
 NEPA requires 
that all federal agencies, including the military, file an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) in such situations.
25
 The EIS is a detailed report 
 
 
(2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 7604 (2006); Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9659 (2006). Suits under environmental statutes without citizen suit provisions, such as the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006), are filed through the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2006). 
 17. Endangered Species Act § 1531(a)(3). 
 18. Id. § 1533. 
 19. Id. §§ 1532(19), 1538. 
 20. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1423 (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 216 
(2008) (Marine Mammal Protection Act Regulations). 
 21. ―The primary objective of this management must be to maintain the health and stability of the 
marine ecosystem; this in theory indicates that animals must be managed for their benefit and not for 
the benefit of commercial exploitation.‖ H.R. REP. NO. 92-707, at 22 (1971) (Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries) (emphasis added). ―The effect of this set of requirements is to insist that the 
management of animal populations be carried out with the interest of the animals as the prime 
consideration.‖ Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
 22. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006). 
 23. Id. § 1455b. 
 24. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006). 
 25. NEPA Compliance and Enforcement, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
Compliance/nepa/ (last updated Aug. 6, 2010). 
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following extensive investigation and research of the possible negative 
impact of government activities on wildlife and natural resources.
26
 The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reviews and rates all EISs and 
suggests reasonable alternatives to proposed actions that might mitigate 
foreseeable environmental harm.
27
 For example, should the military 
choose a site for missile testing, it must hire experts to determine the 
potential short- and long-term harm to the soil, water, air, and plant and 
animal life. The military will submit its EIS, and the EPA may suggest that 
the military choose a less intrusive site, relocate the wildlife, or plant trees 
elsewhere to replace those to be destroyed. Should the EPA fail to 
prosecute perpetrators, civil suits by concerned citizens are the only 
remaining avenue for wildlife protection.
28
 
B. Standing to Sue in Civil Environmental Actions 
It is necessary to understand the arduousness of the standing doctrine in 
environmental litigation in order to appreciate why courts are ambiguous 
in conducting harm analysis under the test for preliminary injunctions. 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires that all matters before the 
court be a case or controversy.
29
 Plaintiffs must meet both constitutional 
and prudential standing requirements in order to sue.
30
 Constitutional 
standing requires that a plaintiff establish personal injury, that the 
defendant‘s conduct traceably caused the injury, and that the injury is 
likely to be redressed through court-awarded damages or injunctive 
relief.
31
 Additional prudential limitations bar standing for third parties, 
generalized grievances, and claims outside statutory zones of interest.
32
  
When an individual or, as is more common, an environmental rights 
organization seeks to sue on behalf of an animal or species, the standing 
doctrine requires that at least one of the human plaintiffs satisfies all of 
these requirements.
33
 Plaintiffs may not establish standing by invoking the 
 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Hambrick, supra note 13, at 55–57; see also Tomb, supra note 2, at 60, 62. 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 
(1992). 
 30. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–18 (2007); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 31. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 32. Id. at 560; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Citizen suit provisions, paired with the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2009), relax prudential standing prohibitions on 
generalized grievances and third-party standing. See FAIC Sec., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 
357 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 33. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505. 
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animals‘ injury, but rather must claim that the defendant‘s harm to the 
animals negatively impacted the humans’ rights.34 Examples of sufficient 
human injuries include impediments to the right to study and observe the 
animals (if the plaintiff is a scientist or scholar) or a strong and 
particularized emotional attachment.
35
 
Associational standing is permitted where, in absence of injury to itself, 
an organization asserts a case on behalf of its members who can 
simultaneously establish individual standing.
36
 Civil environmental 
plaintiffs, which are typically large environmental advocacy organizations, 
 
 
 34. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 
U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982) (―[T]he plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and 
cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.‖ (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975))); see also Cassandra Barnum, Injury in Fact, Then and Now (and Never 
Again): Summers v. Earth Island Institute and the Need for Change in Environmental Standing Law, 
17 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 1, 59 n.264 (2009) (offering Christopher Stone‘s comments, ―‗Oh, 
for Pete‘s sake, just sue in the name of the seals‘ . . . ‗The seals are being bludgeoned to death and 
somebody‘s saying, ‗I want to be seeing seals.‘ That‘s not what it‘s about. It‘s a very backwards way 
of getting the case into court.‘‖ (quoting Rebecca Tuhus-Dubrow, Sued by the Forest: Should Nature 
be Able to Take You to Court?, BOSTON GLOBE, July 19, 2009, at C4)). 
 35. Plaintiffs commonly plead emotional distress from witnessing or learning of the animals‘ 
suffering and loss of opportunity to observe and study those animals. In order to successfully claim the 
emotional distress factor, however, the human plaintiff must demonstrate a very strong personal 
connection. See Am. Soc‘y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & 
Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (granting standing to a former elephant handler seeking 
to prevent ongoing ill treatment of his elephants because the handler had an emotional and physical 
reaction to such treatment). But see Int‘l Primate Prot. League v. Adm‘rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 
895 F.2d 1056, 1059–61 (5th Cir. 1990) (the Silver Springs Monkey Case, where former lab worker 
did not have standing to prevent allegedly unlawful testing on lab monkeys despite his emotional bond 
with them), rev’d on other grounds, 500 U.S. 72, 76–78 (1991) (granting standing based on 
petitioners‘ right to contest removal of their law suit to federal court, but not based on their desire to 
protect the monkeys, as that issue was not raised on appeal). In order to successfully claim a loss of 
opportunity to observe and enjoy an animal or species, the human plaintiff must establish that the 
claim is based on the needs of his or her profession, though some courts have found recreational and 
observational interests sufficient. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 594 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Japan 
Whaling Ass‘n v. Am. Cetacean Soc‘y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986) (standing granted to protect 
scientific whale watching); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 428–29 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (granting standing based on aesthetic injury to a tourist who had planned multiple return visits to 
a game farm where primates were held under inhumane conditions); Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed‘n v. 
Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 1987) (standing for observation and hunting of migratory birds); 
Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1005–08 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (standing for observation of 
Cape fur seals in natural and undisturbed habitat); Humane Soc‘y of Rochester & Monroe Cnty. v. 
Lyng, 633 F. Supp. 480, 485 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (standing granted because New York law authorized 
humane society to ―prosecute violations of animal cruelty laws,‖ including branding of livestock); Am. 
Horse Prot. Ass‘n v. Frizzell, 403 F. Supp. 1206, 1214 (D. Nev. 1975) (standing for continued 
observation of wild horses). 
 36. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm‘n, 432 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1977); Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).  
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often rely on associational standing when the injuries to the organization 
and its individual members ―are in every practical sense identical.‖37  
It is clear that Congress has not granted animals standing to sue in their 
own right,
38
 though Article III of the U.S. Constitution may not prevent it 
from doing so.
39
 Instead, when Congress enacted environmental statutes, it 
included citizen suit provisions that permit the public to challenge 
government actions that adversely affect the ecosystem or wildlife within 
it.
40
 Under such provisions, Congress limited the available relief to 
equitable relief, including preliminary and permanent injunctions.
41
 
Violations of environmental statutes without citizen suit provisions may 
still be redressed under Chapter Seven of the Administrative Procedure 
Act.
42
 Since the enactment of modern environmental legislation, animal 
rights groups have taken advantage of citizen suit provisions and the APA 
to sue the government for its injurious actions on behalf of the threatened 
wildlife. Thus, environmental organizations wishing to litigate on behalf 
of the environment can do so under citizen suit provisions by way of the 
associational standing doctrine. 
Legal scholars have analyzed with considerable detail the ways to more 
clearly and appropriately address standing in civil environmental suits.
43
 
 
 
 37. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., 517 U.S. 544, 
551–52 (1996) (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958)). Associational 
standing exists when (1) at least one of the organization‘s members has standing to sue in his or her 
own right, (2) ―the interests [the association] seeks to protect are germane to the organization‘s 
purpose,‖ and (3) ―neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of 
individual members in the lawsuit.‖ Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. For a case demonstrating plaintiffs‘ failure 
to properly plead associational standing for animal protection, see Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass‘n v. 
Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 38. Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New Eng. Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 
45, 49 (D. Mass. 1993) (―[T]he MMPA expressly authorizes suits brought by persons, not animals. 
This court will not impute to Congress or the President the intention to provide standing to a marine 
mammal without a clear statement in the statute. If Congress and the President intended to take the 
extraordinary step of authorizing animals . . . to sue, they could, and should, have said so plainly.‖). 
 39. The Ninth Circuit has stated:  
 It is obvious that an animal cannot function as a plaintiff in the same manner as a 
juridically competent human being. But we see no reason why Article III prevents Congress 
from authorizing a suit in the name of an animal, any more than it prevents suits brought in 
the name of artificial persons such as corporations, partnerships or trusts, and even ships, or 
of juridically incompetent persons such as infants, juveniles, and mental incompetents. 
Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 40. See id.; FAVRE, supra note 13, at 337; see also Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after 
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1982). For a discussion of 
the motivations behind citizen suit provisions, see Adam Babich, Citizen Suits: The Teeth in Public 
Participation, [1995] 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,141 (1995). 
 41. FAVRE, supra note 13, at 337. 
 42. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2010). 
 43. See Hambrick, supra note 13; Sunstein, supra note 40; Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees 
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Proposals from wildlife advocates seek to amend the standing doctrine by 
granting animals standing to sue in their own right, realistically 
implemented through human advocates.
44
 Some propose that the courts or 
even the Secretary of the Interior be given the duty of appointing court 
representatives for the threatened wildlife.
45
 One suggestion includes 
expanding Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include a 
clause addressing the representation of animals and resources.
46
 It is also 
possible that permitting animal standing would, in practice, hardly alter 
the status quo (and thus may not be worth the trouble of lobbying), since 
environmental organizations already self-appoint. However, granting 
standing directly to animals would raise many slippery-slope concerns, 
including whether a human could sue an animal or species that had 
allegedly wronged the human.
47
 The radicalness of this proposal justifiably 
prevents courts and legislators from recognizing animal standing.
48
 
 
 
Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1 (1985). See generally Preston Carter, Note, “If an (Endangered) Tree Falls in the Forest and 
No One is Around . . . .”: Resolving the Divergence Between Standing Requirements and 
Congressional Intent in Environmental Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2191 (2009). 
 44. See Carter, supra note 43, at 2229–30; see also infra note 150. Advocates temper the shock 
of this proposal by arguing that standing does not give the animal any additional legal rights (rights to 
life, liberty, and property) other than the right to sue under a specific statute. See id. at 2232. Sunstein, 
President Obama‘s Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, is 
also a proponent of animal standing—a position which nearly lost him the job. Rachel Weiner, Cass 
Sunstein Nomination Blocked by Saxby Chambliss, HUFFINGTON POST, June 29, 2009, 
http://www.huffington post.com/2009/06/29/cass-sunstein-nomination_n_222196.html. 
 45. See Carter, supra note 43, at 2230, 2233.  
[C]ourts should adopt a legal fiction that the animal is ―autonomous‖ and, therefore, a 
―person,‖ as it does in the case of legally incompetent humans. In practice, courts would be 
charged with resolving animal conflicts by determining what the animal would wish if it were 
capable of speaking for itself. 
Hélène Landemore, Why Should One Reject the Motion Intending to Remove Animals from the Status 
of Property?, in PEOPLE, PROPERTY, OR PETS 65, 72 (Marc D. Hauser et al. eds., 2006) (discussing 
Steven Wise‘s viewpoint in RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000)); see 
also Stone, supra note 43, at 2. Switzerland, known for its strong protection of animal rights, recently 
and overwhelmingly rejected a referendum that would have required each canton to hire animal 
attorneys. Deborah Ball, Swiss Reject Law on Animal Rights, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2010, at A12, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703936804575107811656131100.html; 
Deborah Ball, Scales of Justice: In Zurich, Even Fish Have a Lawyer, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2010, at 
A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB10001424052748703915204575 
103520836794314.html. 
 46. See Carter, supra note 43, at 2223. 
 47. Still, these slippery-slope concerns over animals-as-defendants may be resolved by Article III 
standing requirements: because a human would be unable to obtain compensatory damages from an 
animal or species, and because the court would have a difficult time enforcing an injunction against the 
same without also compelling a human owner or caretaker to comply with a court mandate, it is 
unlikely that the human could meet the constitutional standing requirement of redressability against 
animal defendants. 
 48. The administrative burden of expanding the standing doctrine may increase the amount of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/5
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C. The Test for Preliminary Injunctions 
After overcoming the standing requirements in environmental and 
wildlife litigation, plaintiffs continue to face special difficulties beyond 
those in normal litigation. Because the stakes are high, plaintiffs often 
request a preliminary injunction to prevent ongoing harm or destruction to 
the environment during litigation.
49
 However, the opposing interests in 
environmental litigation are strong, often including the cost of withholding 
or forfeiting millions of dollars for planned land development and 
commercial growth or, as in Winter, the public risks of inhibiting military 
training activities.  
Courts facing a request for a preliminary injunction conduct a four-part 
test. The plaintiff seeking the temporary relief must ―establish [1] that he 
is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable 
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities 
tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.‖50 
These four factors are evaluated separately and weighed against each other 
to determine whether the preliminary relief should be granted.
51
 The first 
 
 
environmental litigation and exacerbate the widespread epidemic of overcrowded dockets. The 
courtroom would literally become a zoo! Furthermore, groups composed of farmers, slaughterhouses, 
product-testing laboratories, and land developers would raise a strong, united front against the 
possibility of increasing their personal liability. 
 49. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL CASES 
AND MATERIALS 45–46 (9th ed. 2005).  
Preliminary injunctions are particularly important in environmental and other cases in which 
the courts have recognized that the absence of preliminary relief will result in severe, 
irreparable injury, including loss of life, serious safety violations, or destruction of the 
environment. Indeed, preliminary relief is often necessary to prevent an entire case from 
becoming moot. 
Earthjustice, William Myers’ Views on Access to the Courts Violate Ninth Circuit Precedent and 
Would Effectively Bar Many Vital Environmental and Other Public Interest Claims, JUDGING THE 
ENVIRONMENT, available at http://www.judgingtheenvironment.org/library/reports_analysis/Myers_ 
Access_Courts.pdf. 
 50. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008). The test for granting a 
stay is nearly identical. See Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009). The test for permanent 
injunctions also contains a similar analysis. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 
(2006). 
 51. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); see also Winter, 129 
S. Ct. at 392 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (―Consistent with equity‘s character, courts do not insist that 
litigants uniformly show a particular, predetermined quantum of probable success or injury before 
awarding equitable relief.‖); Cronin v. U.S. Dep‘t of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 445 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(―[W]hen the likelihood that the plaintiff‘s claim is unjust is weighted by the (slight) harm to the 
defendant if the injunction is granted, granting the injunction may be only a slight injustice to the 
defendant even if the defendant has a somewhat stronger case.‖). For Judge Posner‘s discussion of a 
mathematical explanation of weighing the preliminary injunction factors, see Lawson Prods., Inc. v. 
Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433–34 (7th Cir. 1986).  
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two factors (success on the merits and irreparable harm) are crucial.
52
 
Some courts follow the ―sliding scale‖ approach, wherein a strong 
showing of irreparable injury lowers the burden of showing likelihood of 
success on the merits and vice versa.
53
 The Supreme Court has held that 
even where there is a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate at least a likelihood of irreparable harm.
54
 
The first factor—whether the plaintiff established a likelihood of 
success on the merits—is straightforward. Courts review the existing 
discovery to determine whether the proponent has made a clear showing 
that the opponent violated the law at issue.
55
 Although this does not 
require a full evidentiary hearing, incomplete records are often fatal to 
plaintiffs at this early stage of litigation.
56
 
The second factor of the test requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that, 
absent immediate relief, defendants will cause irreparable injury to the 
plaintiffs‘ interests during litigation.57 In civil environmental litigation, 
plaintiffs can successfully plead irreparable injury by showing that the 
defendant‘s conduct may destroy a species;58 anything less falls within a 
gray zone. Even localized harm to a species may not be worthy of relief.
59
 
The third factor of the test involves balancing party harm, wherein 
courts weigh the harm to plaintiffs absent preliminary relief and the harm 
to defendants if the preliminary injunction is granted.
60
 In the 
 
 
 52. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1761. 
 53. Justice Ginsburg‘s dissent in Winter suggests that the sliding scale approach was not affected 
by the majority opinion: ―[C]ourts have evaluated claims for equitable relief on a ‗sliding scale,‘ 
sometimes awarding relief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood of success is very 
high. This Court has never rejected that formulation, and I do not believe it does so today.‖ Winter, 
129 S. Ct. at 392 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  
 54. Id. at 375 (majority opinion). 
 55. Id.; Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam). 
 56. See Cronin, 919 F. 2d at 445–46; Lawson Prods., Inc., 782 F.2d at 1440 (―[W]hen . . . there 
are two equally credible versions of the facts the court should be highly cautious in granting an 
injunction without the benefit of a full trial.‖). 
 57. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374. 
 58. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 136 (1976) (―[T]here is grave danger that the 
Devil‘s Hole pupfish may be destroyed, resulting in irreparable injury to the United States.‖ (quoting 
United States v. Cappaert, 375 F. Supp. 456, 460 (D. Nev. 1974))). 
 59. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376; Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 
(1987) (noting that environmental injury is permanent and hard to remedy, but irreparable injury is not 
presumed merely because a federal agency fails to consider the environmental impact of its proposed 
actions). But see William S. Eubanks II, Comment, Damage Done? The Status of NEPA After Winter 
v. NRDC and Answers to Lingering Questions Left Open by the Court, 33 VT. L. REV. 649, 660 (2009) 
(―[L]ocalized impacts—including such impacts on wildlife—may be sufficient to establish irreparable 
injury.‖). 
 60. Some courts identify this factor as ―harm to the defendant‖ since the irreparable injury factor 
of the test already addresses the plaintiffs‘ harm, and the test for preliminary injunctions, as a 
balancing test, already compares and weighs these factor against each other. See, e.g., W. Watersheds 
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environmental context, many courts have held that where irreparable 
injury is likely, the balancing test automatically favors the plaintiff.
61
 
Harm to the defendant that is purely pecuniary or otherwise trivial 
generally falls short of outweighing harm to the environment.
62
  
The fourth factor of the test entertains public policy concerns. It is 
sometimes considered a balancing test for the opposing public harms, as 
courts evaluate the consequences to the general public in granting or 
denying the injunction.
63
 One court has described the public interest factor 
as a ―wild card,‖ remarking that definitions of the public interest and 
public policy are highly discretionary.
64
 
D. The Scope of “Plaintiffs’ Harm” 
The most discernible problem with conducting factual analysis under 
the four-part preliminary injunction test in civil environmental litigation 
occurs when evaluating the second and third factors. Both factors—
irreparable injury to plaintiffs‘ interests and balancing plaintiffs‘ and 
defendant‘s injuries—require courts to consider the ―plaintiffs‘ harm.‖ 
Case law has failed to explicitly define the scope of injury to the plaintiff 
in environmental protection lawsuits: is it the harm to the human plaintiff 
who has standing to bring the claim, the harm to the animal (whose 
impending injury is usually the underlying motivation for litigation), or an 
amalgamation of the harm to both?
65
 Although constitutional standing 
 
 
Project v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 09-0507, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98520, at *15–16 (D. Idaho 
Oct. 14, 2009); In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 675 F. Supp. 2d 89, 103 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 61. See Amoco Prod., 480 U.S. at 545 (―If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance 
of harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment.‖); Tenn. Valley 
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (―Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it 
abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest 
of priorities . . . .‖); Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005) (―Congress has 
decided that under the ESA, the balance of hardships always tips sharply in favor of the endangered or 
threatened species.‖); see also Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 1996); Ocean 
Mammal Inst. v. Gates, 546 F. Supp. 2d 960, 970 (D. Haw. 2008). Note that these cases were primarily 
argued under the ESA, whereas Winter encompassed a variety of laws including the ESA but was 
centered on the NEPA claim. 
 62. See Cronin v. U.S. Dep‘t of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 445 (7th Cir. 1990) (observing that the 
time value of the defendant‘s profit was probably trivial, and because it was purely pecuniary and 
avoidable, not stronger than the plaintiffs‘ harm). 
 63. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440–41 (1944). 
 64. Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 65. The definition of plaintiffs‘ harm in the preliminary injunction test is also relevant in the 
abortion context. When right-to-life organizations bring suit on behalf of unborn fetuses, should the 
court look at the harm to the fetus, harm to the organizations‘ members, or both? Fetuses are not 
capable of suing in court, though FED. R. CIV. P. 17 may grant them special representation. See 
Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1023 (1st Cir. 1981) (failing to decide the issue 
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requires the human plaintiff who initiated litigation to have an injury of his 
or her own without evoking third-party harm to the animal, it is not a 
foregone conclusion that the preliminary injunction test considers only the 
harm to the human plaintiff with standing.
66
 Courts themselves have not 
chosen one standard or another, inconsistently defining ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ 
as harm to the human, animal, or both.
67
 As discussed infra, the minority 
view implicitly restricts the definition to human harm only, while the 
majority of courts are more flexible and incorporate wildlife harm within 
the analysis.
68
 
The scope of ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ is material, as the decision of whether 
to include animal harm in the analysis is often outcome dispositive.
69
 If 
only the harm to the named plaintiff (the human) is used, it may be 
possible to demonstrate the irreparable injury factor, but it will be difficult 
to outweigh the risk to the defendant‘s interests under the harm-balancing 
factor. For example, a human plaintiff‘s mere emotional distress or loss of 
opportunity to observe a species in its native habitat may seem trivial 
when weighed against million-dollar losses in forestalled development 
projects. If, on the other hand, the harm to wildlife is part of the 
―plaintiffs‘ harm,‖ it is easier for plaintiffs to meet their burden under the 
 
 
of whose harm should be considered in the analysis, but noting the possible effects of defining the 
scope of ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ in different ways); see also Stephen J. Wallace, Note, Why Third-Party 
Standing in Abortion Suits Deserve a Closer Look, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369 (2009). 
 66. For a basic example of when courts consider harm to those other than the plaintiff, the fourth 
factor of the preliminary injunction test considers various interests of the public. See supra note 63 and 
accompanying text. As one scholar explained:  
In enacting the modern environmental statutes, Congress concluded that the common law did 
not adequately protect the environment in part because it did not recognize the unique nature 
of environmental harm: environmental injury is often physically and temporally distant from 
the harmful action; environmental destruction often causes noneconomic injury, such as harm 
to aesthetic or recreational interests; and environmental destruction can harm interests that are 
nonhuman, such as plants, animals, and ecosystems, wholly separate from any harm to 
people. 
Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485, 529 (2010). 
Moreover, some animals are actually named as plaintiffs and are even granted standing when the 
animal standing is not contested. See, e.g., Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d 1068; Mt. Graham Red Squirrel 
v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1568 (9th Cir. 1993); Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 
1991); Palila v. Haw. Dep‘t of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988); Coho Salmon v. 
Pac. Lumber Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (N.D. Cal. 1999); N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 
(W.D. Wash. 1991); N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988).  
 67. See infra Part IV for a discussion of courts that have chosen each of these standards. 
 68. See infra Part IV. 
 69. See Goldstein, supra note 66, at 531–32. Outcome-dispositive standards are incubators for 
judicial activism. FAVRE, supra note 13, at 344 (―While a decision by a judge on the issue of standing 
is not supposed to reflect any opinion on the possible outcome of the merits of the case, every judge 
knows that if a plaintiff is found to not have standing, then in effect the plaintiff loses the case without 
the judge having to address the merits of the case.‖). 
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harm-balancing factor.
70
 What judge would rule that the relocation of a 
building project is graver than the extinction of the American Bald 
Eagle?
71
 
In Winter, the Supreme Court was faced with the propriety of granting 
a preliminary injunction in a civil environmental protection case.
72
 The 
plaintiff, environmental organization Natural Resource Defense Council 
(NRDC), sought to prevent injury to thousands of marine mammals. The 
Court compared the harm to the plaintiff with the harm to defendant, the 
United States Navy, and ruled in favor of the Navy.
73
 As discussed infra, 
the Court failed to decide whether ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ encompasses human 
injury, animal injury, or injury to both in the preliminary injunction test.
74
 
However, in mentioning that the plaintiffs‘ injuries were merely 
recreational, the Court may have implicitly adopted the minority standard 
of defining ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ as human harm only. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN WINTER V. NRDC 
A. Case Background 
In 2008, the Supreme Court reversed a preliminary injunction against 
the U.S. Navy that would have halted certain sonar emission activities to 
prevent harm to marine mammals.
75
 On a military base in Southern 
California, the Navy conducted training activities for submarine detection 
that involved emitting active sonar pulses.
76
 The ocean region used for 
testing sonar blasts contained at least thirty-seven species of dolphin, 
whale, sea lion, and other marine mammals.
77
  
 
 
 70. See Eubanks, supra note 59, at 659. But see Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 
1250, 1257 (10th Cir. 2003) (―Plaintiffs contend that a proponent of a preliminary injunction under 
these circumstances, seeking to prevent harm to members of a threatened or endangered species, need 
not show harm to the species as a whole. We agree.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 71. The balance of harms may not be as extreme as this example and may depend on the statute 
at issue. However, the import of the additional weight to the plaintiffs‘ scale remains. 
 72. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
 73. Plaintiff NRDC‘s standing to sue was not addressed in the Supreme Court case. Transcipt of 
Oral Argument at 24, 51, Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (No. 07-
1239), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ argument_transcripts/07-1239.pdf 
(Justice Scalia was particularly concerned with the procedural standing issue). 
 74. See discussion infra Part III. 
 75. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 382 (2008). 
 76. Id. at 370. 
 77. Id. at 371. 
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Under NEPA, the Navy was required to prepare an EIS analyzing the 
environmental impact of the training activities before it could begin.
78
 The 
Navy first completed a smaller report to determine if an EIS was 
necessary.
79
 The Navy conceded that in its own study, it found that the 
past and continuing training activities using sonar emissions caused severe 
physical injuries to five species of endangered whales and nearly twenty-
five other marine species.
80
 These injuries purportedly included 
hemorrhaging around the brain and ears; lesions in the liver, lungs, and 
kidneys; and nitrogen bubbles in other organs and tissue.
81
 Despite these 
findings, the Navy felt that its activities would not significantly impact the 
environment and decided not to prepare a full EIS.
82
 The NRDC utilized 
the Administrative Procedure Act and citizen suit provisions to sue the 
Navy for violating the ESA, MMPA, CZMA, and NEPA.
83
 
In a federal district court in California, the NRDC requested and 
received a temporary restraining order against the Navy‘s use of mid-
frequency active sonar, but it eventually settled with the Navy after the 
latter agreed to implement certain mitigation measures.
84
 Several months 
after the settlement, the Navy developed fourteen new sonar training 
exercises, again without completing an EIS.
85
 The NRDC sued the Navy 
once more and requested a preliminary injunction to force the Navy to file 
an EIS before it could proceed with its training.
86
 Filing the EIS would 
give power to the EPA, rather than the Navy, to determine whether the 
Navy‘s training activities were too harmful to the marine mammals. The 
district court granted NRDC‘s preliminary injunction to prohibit the Navy 
 
 
 78. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006). See supra text 
accompanying notes 24–27. 
 79. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 388 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 80. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 81. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 392 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Charles Siebert, Watching 
Whales Watching Us, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/ 
12/magazine/12whales-t.html?_r=1&emc=etal.  
 82. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 388 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that preparing an 
Environmental Assessment, an evaluation used to determine whether to prepare an EIS, does not 
satisfy the burden to complete an EIS). 
 83. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2008). The 
APA provides the vehicle for claims under NEPA, while the ESA and CZMA contain citizen suit 
provisions. The Navy was provided an exemption under the MMPA by the Secretary of Defense. 
Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 371. 
 84. Settlement Agreement, Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, No. 06-CV-4131 (C.D. 
Cal. July 7, 2006); Temporary Restraining Order at 6, Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, No. 
06-CV-4131 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2006). 
 85. Lisa Lightbody, Comment, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 33 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 593, 595 (2009). 
 86. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372. 
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from conducting its exercises until it had filed an EIS.
87
 The court found 
that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, that there was a 
possibility of irreparable harm to the environment, and that this harm 
outweighed any harm to the Navy.
88
 The Navy filed a motion to stay; the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction but 
remanded to require the district court to narrowly tailor its order.
89
 The 
district court imposed six conditions on the Navy if it continued its 
activities, two of which the Navy appealed.
90
 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, 
and the Navy filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme 
Court granted.
91
 
B. Majority Opinion 
On November 12, 2008, the Winter Court reversed the judgment of the 
lower courts and vacated the portions of the preliminary injunction 
contested by the Navy.
92
 The majority found that the lower court abused 
its discretion when it used the wrong standard in granting the NRDC‘s 
preliminary injunction.
93
 The lower court had used a ―possibility of 
irreparable injury‖ standard for the second factor of the test, whereas it 
should have used a ―likelihood of irreparable injury‖ standard.94 The 
majority further criticized the lower courts for failing to consider the 
 
 
 87. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 645 F. Supp. 2d 841, 855 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 88. Id.; see also Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372–73. 
 89. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 508 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 90. The conditions included:  
(1) imposing a 12-mile ―exclusion zone‖ from the coastline; (2) using lookouts to conduct 
additional monitoring for marine mammals; (3) restricting the use of ―helicopter-dipping‖ 
sonar; (4) limiting the use of MFA sonar in geographic ―choke points‖; (5) shutting down 
MFA sonar when a marine mammal is spotted within 2,200 yards of a vessel; and (6) 
powering down MFA sonar by 6 dB during significant surface ducting conditions, in which 
sound travels further than it otherwise would due to temperature differences in adjacent layers 
of water. 
Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 
1118–21 (C.D. Cal. 2008)). The Navy appealed the final two conditions. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373. 
 91. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2964 (2008) (granting certiorari). 
 92. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 365. 
 93. Id. at 382. 
 94. The Supreme Court itself was uncertain as to the standard used by the lower court. Id. at 376. 
In fact, it appears that even though the lower court used a ―possibility‖ of irreparable injury standard, it 
found that plaintiffs established a ―near certainty‖ of irreparable injury, which is a stronger finding 
than ―likelihood‖ of injury. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 645 F. Supp. 2d 841, 855 (C.D. 
Cal. 2007). Regardless of whether the Supreme Court wrongly characterized the lower court‘s standard 
of irreparable injury, its decision to remand was supported by the failure of the lower court to give 
proper consideration to defendant‘s harm. 
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Navy‘s evidence of hardship and injury to the full extent that it deserved.95 
The Court stated that it need not address the merits of the case, instead 
remanding for further findings of fact.
96
 However, the majority sua sponte 
applied the preliminary injunction test to the facts before it, even though 
its application of the test on the merits was dictum and would not be 
binding on the lower court after further discovery.
97
 
In its analysis of the facts under the preliminary injunction test, the 
majority favored the Navy‘s position.98 The majority dismissed the first 
factor in the preliminary injunction test (likelihood of success on the 
merits), noting that consideration of the other factors alone required a 
denial of the injunction.
99
 It also quickly disposed of the public interest 
factor, simply mentioning that any injury to the plaintiffs was outweighed 
by the public interest and the Navy‘s interest in training its personnel.100 
The majority spent the bulk of its analysis on the second and third 
factors of the preliminary injunction test (the likelihood of irreparable 
harm to plaintiffs absent a preliminary injunction and the balance of this 
harm with harm to defendants).
101
 In its analysis of these factors, the Court 
focused on the harm to defendants, criticizing the lower courts for 
discounting the Navy‘s evidence.102 In defining the plaintiffs‘ harm, the 
Court did not state whether it should consider the harm to the NRDC 
organization‘s members, the harm to the marine mammals, or the harm to 
both. However, the majority opinion mentioned only the potential human 
injury; it characterized the scope of the plaintiffs‘ investment as limited to 
 
 
 95. ―The lower courts did not give sufficient weight to the views of several top Navy officers, 
who emphasized that because training scenarios can take several days to develop, each additional 
shutdown can result in the loss of several days‘ worth of training.‖ Id. at 379. 
 96.  
[W]e do not address the underlying merits of plaintiffs‘ claims. While we have authority to 
proceed to such a decision at this point, doing so is not necessary here. In addition, reaching 
the merits is complicated by the fact that the lower courts addressed only one of several issues 
raised, and plaintiffs have largely chosen not to defend the decision below on that ground. 
Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381 (citation omitted). 
 97. See Eubanks, supra note 59, at 659 (―Although the majority opinion recognized that ‗the 
Navy asserts that plaintiffs have failed to offer evidence of species-level harm that would adversely 
affect their scientific, recreational, and ecological interests,‘ the majority never relied on this assertion 
as a basis for its ruling.‖ (footnote omitted)). However, the majority noted that its analysis of 
preliminary injunctive relief also applied to any permanent injunctive relief. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381–
82. 
 98. Id. at 382. 
 99. Id. at 376. 
 100. Id. Ironically, the Court quickly disposed of the public interest and the likelihood of success 
on the merits factors of the test for preliminary injunctions, despite its criticism of the lower court‘s 
―cursory‖ analysis of some of the factors of the test for preliminary injunctions. Id. at 378. 
 101. Id. at 375–81. 
 102. Id. at 374–78. 
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the plaintiffs‘ aesthetic and professional interests, which it defined as 
plaintiffs‘ ability to take whale watching trips, conduct scientific research, 
and observe and photograph the animals in their natural habitats.
103
 The 
Court wrote: 
We do not discount the importance of plaintiffs‘ ecological, 
scientific, and recreational interests in marine mammals. Those 
interests, however, are plainly outweighed by the Navy‘s need to 
conduct realistic training exercises to ensure that it is able to 
neutralize the threat posed by enemy submarines.
104
 
The majority did not discuss animal injury within the breadth of harm 
to the plaintiff. Only once did it mention injury to marine mammals; but 
even that statement was made merely in the context of ―impairing 
plaintiffs‘ ability to study and observe‖ them.105 Furthermore, the majority 
stated that ―[f]or the plaintiffs, the most serious possible injury would be 
harm to an unknown number of the marine mammals that they study and 
observe.‖106 This phraseology, coupled with the Court‘s previous 
recognition of only the humans‘ harm, implies that the Court did not 
consider the marine mammals‘ harm within the scope of ―plaintiffs‘ 
harm.‖107 This omission is ironic given the majority‘s criticism of the 
lower courts for limiting the scope of defendant‘s harm.108 Notably, the 
majority never criticized or even addressed the lower courts‘ significant 
reliance on animal injury in contemplating the full scope of harm to the 
plaintiffs. 
 
 
 103. Id. at 377. 
 104. Id. at 382. 
 105. The majority wrote, ―Plaintiffs contend that the Navy‘s use of MFA sonar will injure 
marine mammals or alter their behavioral patterns, impairing plaintiffs‘ ability to study and observe 
the animals.‖ Id. at 377 78. This acknowledgement of animal injury is tempered because the Court did 
so only as a restatement of the plaintiffs‘ contention. The Court continued to filter animal harm 
through the lens of the human plaintiffs‘ interests, rather than acknowledge the animals‘ independent 
harm. 
 106. Id. at 377 78. If the majority were also considering harm to the animals within the 
―plaintiffs‘ harm,‖ then the most serious possible injury to plaintiffs would have been death and further 
species endangerment. See Siebert, supra note 81 (observing that the majority ―minimize[d], in a fairly 
dismissive tone, the issue of harm to marine life‖). 
 107. Lightbody, supra note 85, at 600–01 (―The Court ignored the potential for serious animal and 
species-level harm and limited its consideration to the harm NRDC members had alleged for standing 
purposes.‖). 
 108. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375. 
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C. Concurrence and Dissent 
The Winter concurring and dissenting opinions characterized the extent 
of ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ more broadly than the majority. In his opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Breyer, joined in part by 
Justice Stevens, discussed the danger to the environment absent a 
preliminary remedy.
109
 Breyer did not address the facts under all of the 
preliminary injunction test factors, though he did balance the plaintiffs‘ 
and defendant‘s harms.110 Along with the majority, Breyer acknowledged 
the faults of the district court‘s analysis due to insufficient weight given to 
the Navy‘s evidence.111 But in contemplating the plaintiffs‘ harm, Breyer 
discussed only the marine mammals‘ harm, entirely dispensing with the 
harm to the human plaintiffs.
112
 Breyer referred to the district court‘s 
analysis of the potential for harm to the wildlife, as described in the 
military reports, without criticizing or diminishing the importance that the 
lower courts placed upon the animals‘ injuries.113 He ultimately voted to 
reverse the preliminary injunction because he felt that scientific evidence 
of actual injury to the marine mammals was lacking.
114
 Breyer wrote that 
―[w]ithout such evidence [of the damage to the marine mammals], it is 
difficult to assess the relevant harm—that is, the environmental harm 
likely caused by the Navy‘s exercises‖—and therefore impossible to apply 
the preliminary injunction test without remanding for further findings of 
fact.
115
 Breyer‘s emphasis as to the need to consider ―the relevant harm‖ 
seemed to be a disparagement of the majority‘s avoidance of addressing 
harm to the marine mammals.
116
 In addition to remanding for fuller 
discovery, Breyer ultimately would have forced the Navy to craft its 
training program in a manner that would mitigate potential harm to the 
mammals.
117
 
The dissent analyzed animal injury to an even greater extent than the 
concurrence. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, found that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the preliminary 
injunction.
118
 Ginsburg wrote at length about the serious physical injuries 
 
 
 109. Id. at 382 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 110. Id. at 383–84. 
 111. Id. at 384–85. 
 112. Id. at 383. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 384. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 386–87. 
 118. Id. at 387 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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suffered by the marine mammals, including that ―[s]onar is linked to mass 
strandings of marine mammals, hemorrhaging around the brain and ears, 
acute spongiotic changes in the central nervous system, and lesions in vital 
organs.‖119 She rejected the notion that the training exercises, though of 
critical national interest, would trump the likely permanent harm and 
destruction to the mammals.
120
 Ginsburg wrote: 
 In my view, this likely harm—170,000 behavioral disturbances, 
including 8,000 instances of temporary hearing loss; and 564 Level 
A harms, including 436 injuries to a beaked whale population 
numbering only 1,121—cannot be lightly dismissed, even in the 
face of an alleged risk to the effectiveness of the Navy‘s 14 training 
exercises.
121
 
Ginsburg exposed the majority for evading the issue of injury to the 
wildlife.
122
 She also noted that the Navy‘s interests did not authorize 
violation of legislative mandates that endangered species are among the 
highest national priorities.
123
 
D. Unearthing the Majority Standard 
In light of the lower court rulings and concurring and dissenting 
opinions, it is clear that the majority was, at the very least, made aware of 
the alleged mammalian injury. Thus, its omission of animal harm analysis 
was likely purposeful.
124
 There are at least three plausible reasons for the 
majority‘s omission of an analysis of wildlife harm: it did not believe that 
such an analysis was appropriate in light of the human-only standing 
doctrine, it did not believe the evidence of animal harm was reliable, or it 
simply wanted to lessen the sting of a controversial decision.  
 
 
 119. Id. at 392.  
 120. Id. at 393. 
 121. Id. 
 122.  
The majority reasons that the environmental harm deserves less weight because the training 
exercises ―have been taking place in SOCAL for the last 40 years,‖ such that ―this is not a 
case in which the defendant is conducting a new type of activity with completely unknown 
effects on the environment.‖  
Id. at 393 n.4 (emphasis added) (quoting Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376 (majority opinion)). Ginsburg‘s 
criticism of the majority was based on its failure to give enough weight to the animals‘ harm, but, in 
fact, the majority seemed to give no weight to the animals‘ harm. 
 123. Id. at 393. 
 124. While this argument requires an analysis of what the majority did not say (especially since it 
did not rule on the merits of the case), the relevant question becomes why the majority chose to ignore 
alleged injuries to the marine mammal population when it discussed the relevant harms. 
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It is possible that the majority believed that the standing doctrine 
precluded it from considering the harm to anyone but the human plaintiffs 
with legal standing. However, if this was the majority‘s reason for 
excluding an analysis of wildlife harm, then it probably would have at 
least criticized the lower courts and concurring and dissenting opinions for 
relying on animal harm, just as it criticized them for their incorrect 
analysis of the defendant‘s harm.125 Given the variation among federal 
district and appellate courts in considering animal harm within the broader 
category of ―plaintiffs‘ harm,‖ the majority also should have taken the 
opportunity to reconcile the circuit split.
126
 By ignoring the harm to the 
animals within the scope of ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ in the irreparable injury and 
balancing test factors, the Court‘s opinion may confuse lower courts that 
seek a hard rule on the scope of plaintiffs‘ harm in animal protection 
lawsuits.
127
 
A second explanation for the Court‘s omission of an animal harm 
analysis could be that, like the concurrence, it found the evidence of harm 
to the animals too uncertain and thus chose to ignore it.
128
 However, if that 
 
 
 125. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 379. The majority criticized the lower courts‘ characterization of the 
defendant‘s harm because they failed to consider the full scope of the defendant‘s interests. Id. The 
majority was also well aware that the lower courts considered animal harm within the scope of 
―plaintiffs‘ harm,‖ as the Solicitor General in his oral arguments quoted language from the Ninth 
Circuit recognizing the irreparable injury to the marine mammals themselves. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 23, Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (No. 07-1239), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-1239.pdf. 
 126. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
 127. One could also argue that rather than directly characterizing plaintiff‘s harm as human-only 
harm, the Court backhandedly characterized the redress of the harm in such a limited way so as to 
avoid the true harm, and therefore the involvement of animals, altogether. The Court wrote: ―Given 
that the ultimate legal claim is that the Navy must prepare an EIS, not that it must cease sonar training, 
there is no basis for enjoining such training in a manner credibly alleged to pose a serious threat to 
national security.‖ Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381. One subsequent opinion asserted that Winter did not 
affect the standards for evaluating party harm:  
Winter does not modify or discuss the TVA v. Hill standard. Although Winter altered the 
Ninth Circuit‘s general preliminary injunctive relief standard by making that standard more 
rigorous, Winter did not address, let alone change, the Circuit‘s approach to the balancing of 
hardships where endangered species and their critical habitat are jeopardized. 
Consol. Salmonid Cases v. Locke, No. 1:09-CV-01053, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9897, at *10 (E.D. 
Cal. Feb. 5, 2010) (footnote omitted) (acknowledging but distinguishing Winter’s analysis on the basis 
that Winter only addressed NEPA claim seeking an EIS and not the ESA claims). For Justice 
Ginsburg‘s response, see supra note 122. Even though the majority focused on the EIS as plaintiff‘s 
ultimate (legal) goal, the court did not characterize the harm to plaintiffs and defendants as purely 
procedural (indeed, Justice Scalia would not have permitted standing for mere procedural injury, see 
supra note 73 and infra note 135). Thus, the substantive harm analysis is still necessary, and the 
definition of ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ remains relevant. Cf. id. (discussing the marine mammal harm, 
presumably under the belief that the animal harm was relevant to the analysis). 
 128. See Lightbody, supra note 85, at 601. 
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indeed was the case, it seems likely that the Court would have at least 
stated this point as a reason for the omission. Also, Justice Breyer himself 
felt that the majority chose to ignore the animals‘ harm for other reasons, 
as he criticized the majority for failing to analyze the ―relevant‖ harm, 
rather than, for example, the ―uncertain‖ harm.129 
A third explanation for the Court‘s analysis could be its desire to thwart 
controversy in issuing a decision hostile to endangered species. It would 
be highly controversial for the Court to decide that naval training is more 
important than 170,000 instances of death or severe injury to endangered 
dolphin and whale species. It is less controversial for the Court to rule that 
national security is more important than the plaintiffs‘ mere ―recreational‖ 
interests in whale watching.
130
 By quietly removing the mammals‘ alleged 
injuries from consideration in the irreparable injury and harm-balancing 
factors of the test, the majority might save itself a great deal of disdain. 
Although life-tenured Justices need not aim to please, public opinion 
undoubtedly impacts decision making.
131
 
Whichever of these or other explanations account for the Winter 
majority‘s failure to consider harm to the mammals, there remains the 
question of whether animal harm can and should make up a share of the 
―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ category within the preliminary injunction test. 
IV. PROPOSALS 
At minimum, the Winter Court failed to explicate the standard for 
analyzing the scope of ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ under the preliminary injunction 
test in environmental litigation. At worst, the decision added to the 
ambiguity of the appropriate criterion for the test and may have implicitly 
encouraged lower courts to adopt the minority standard.
132
 A clear 
 
 
 129. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 384 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 130. See Lightbody, supra note 85, at 601 (―By only recognizing harm directly felt by NRDC 
members, the Winter II court was able to avoid placing a value on environmental damage, which 
would have invited controversy. Instead, the Court could trivialize the injury to NRDC members as 
less long-term, permanent, and worrisome than the direct harm to mammals and mammal species.‖). 
 131. See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian 
Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87 
(1993). 
 132. This confusion is evident from opposing interpretations of Winter. In In Def. of Animals v. 
Salazar, 675 F. Supp. 2d 89, 102–04 (D.D.C. 2009), a district court, quoting the Winter test for 
preliminary injunctions, considered only the harm to the human plaintiff. However, other courts 
considered Winter but continued to bring animal harm within the scope of ―plaintiffs‘ harm.‖ See, e.g., 
W. Watersheds Project v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 09-0507-E-BLW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
98520, at *2, 14–19 (D. Idaho Oct. 14, 2009) (considering harm to the animals, bighorn sheep, after 
evaluating the preliminary injunction test under Winter); San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. 
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standard is necessary because, without it, both parties are unable to 
properly prepare for litigation, and courts are left to their own devices in 
choosing between outcome-dispositive standards.
133
 
The lack of clarity in the application of the preliminary injunction test 
arises from ambiguity as to the scope of harm considered within 
―plaintiffs‘ harm‖: is it the harm to the human plaintiff who has standing 
to bring the claim, the harm to the animal whose suffering is usually the 
underlying motivation for litigation, or the harm to both? This Note offers 
three different approaches that could be used to establish a clear standard 
for the preliminary injunction test. These approaches encompass changes 
to both the standing doctrine and the test for preliminary relief in civil 
environmental protection litigation. The first approach maintains the 
current standing requirements (a human plaintiff must have personal injury 
when wildlife is harmed) and considers only the human‘s injury within the 
preliminary injunction test. The second approach maintains the current 
standing requirements but would require a definition of ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ 
that includes both the human‘s and animals‘ injuries. The third approach 
adjusts the standing doctrine to allow animals standing to sue in their own 
right (with humans acting in a mere representative capacity) and, 
subsequently, would have courts only consider the animals‘ harm as 
―plaintiffs‘ harm.‖ These approaches are discussed in turn below. 
A. Approach One: Human Standing, Human Harm Analysis 
Under the first approach, the current standing doctrine remains 
unaffected, and only the human‘s harm is considered within the scope of 
―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ under the preliminary injunction test.134 This approach 
 
 
Salazar, No. 1:09-CV-01053, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45137, at *3 n.1, 6–7, 8–9 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 
2009) (reasoning that the Winter court found that the harm to the animals was outweighed by the 
military concerns); Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 588 F. Supp. 2d 70, 101–06 (D. Me. 2008) 
(considering whether the new Winter test required a showing of harm to an entire lynx species or only 
one lynx); Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Gates, 546 F. Supp. 2d 960, 983 (D. Haw. 2008) (noting that, per 
the Ninth Circuit‘s Winter test, it was obliged to consider the harm to the animals in the preliminary 
injunction analysis). 
 133. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). It is unlikely that 
Congress wanted these decisions to be made under ambiguous rules. See Sunstein, supra note 40, at 
228–29 (―After Lujan, the law of redressability thus remains as it was before: Extremely fuzzy and 
highly manipulable. It is manipulable, first, because there is no clear metric by which to decide 
whether it is ‗speculative‘ to say that a decree will remedy the plaintiff‘s injury. It is manipulable, 
second, because, as we have seen, whether an injury is redressable depends on how it is defined.‖). 
―Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been 
struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities . . . .‖ Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
 134. One court explained that a human plaintiff‘s harm under NEPA includes procedural injury, 
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logically synchronizes the scope of cognizable injury to plaintiffs in 
establishing standing and awarding relief.
135
 Such a rule would be clear, 
uniform, and predictable. It would also quell widespread fear of animal 
standing by explicitly denying animals the ability to be named as plaintiffs 
or otherwise have their interests directly impact litigation.
136
 
A disadvantage to this option is an emphasis on procedural form over 
substantive policy; it circumvents congressional intent to provide 
protection for threatened and endangered wildlife by focusing on the 
procedurally logical need to reconcile differing definitions of the 
―plaintiff‖ at different stages of litigation.137 Courts could not directly 
consider animals‘ needs at any stage of litigation, but rather could only 
trivialize the threat to wildlife by viewing animal injury as collateral to the 
human‘s interests. This is incompatible with Congress‘s stated purpose in 
enacting protective legislation and citizen suit provisions to guard 
wildlife.
138
 Courts could possibly prevent this incongruence if they 
considered harm to the animal or resource under the ―public interest‖ 
factor of the preliminary injunction test, though this would again create the 
issue of whether environmental harm would be harm in and of itself or 
 
 
such as ―the opportunity to participate in NEPA process at a time when such participation is required 
and is calculated to matter.‖ Save Strawberry Canyon v. U.S. Dep‘t of Energy, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 
1189 (N.D. Cal. 2009). That court, however, distinguished the case from Winter and stated that 
environmental harm may possibly be considered within ―plaintiffs‘ harm,‖ but the harm to human 
plaintiffs‘ procedural injury was sufficient to show irreparable injury. Id. 
 135. In oral argument for Winter, ―Justice Scalia went so far as to evoke explicitly the 
requirements of Article III standing in the discussion of what harms count for purposes of equitable 
injunctions.‖ Neil Gormley, Standing in the Way of Cooperation: Citizen Standing and Compliance 
with Environmental Agreements, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 397, 405–06 (2010) 
(citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 
(2008) (No. 07-1239), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/07-1239.pdf); see also Christopher Kendall, Dangerous Waters? The Future of Irreparable 
Harm Under NEPA After Winter v. NRDC, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11109, 11109–17 
(2009), available at http://www.eli.org/pdf/seminars/04.29.10dc/39.11109.pdf (asserting that the 
proper approach is to consider harm to the animals in the preliminary injunction analysis, but that 
Scalia wrongly confused the preliminary injunction test with the standing requirements). 
 136. But see supra note 44. 
 137. See Carter, supra note 43, at 2237. If the first approach was adopted, the primary focus 
remains on the human harm, which can often be redressed with money (whereas harm to animals and 
the environment cannot be redressed with money unless the money is given to a caretaker for use on 
the environment‘s behalf). In effect, under the ESA, MMPA, CMZA, NEPA, and other animal 
protection statutes, human plaintiffs would use citizen suits to bring personal injury claims for 
injunctive relief. The very fact that Congress limited recovery to injunctive relief under citizen suit 
provisions makes clear that it was less concerned with human recovery and primarily concerned with 
environmental protection. But see Fund for Animals v. Clark, 27 F. Supp. 2d 8, 14 (D.D.C. 1998) 
(―[S]eeing or even contemplating the type of treatment of the bison inherent in an organized hunt 
would cause [the plaintiffs] to suffer an aesthetic injury that is not compensable in money damages.‖).  
 138. See Landemore, supra note 45, at 71; see also Goldstein, supra note 66. 
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merely in relation to the harm to the public‘s recreational and scientific 
interests.
139
 
The human-only harm approach is currently used by a small minority 
of courts. In Fund for Animals v. Clark
140
 and Fund for Animals v. 
Norton,
141
 the courts discussed only the human plaintiffs‘ interests in the 
local animal populations and did not directly consider the threat to these 
animals in analyzing the preliminary injunction test.
142
 Beyond the D.C. 
district courts, no other courts have adopted this restrictive definition of 
the scope of plaintiffs‘ harm. At least one scholar, however, believes that 
this approach was adopted by the Supreme Court in Winter.
143
 
B. Approach Two: Human Standing, Human and Animal Harm Analysis 
Under the second approach, the standing doctrine remains unaffected, 
but both the humans‘ and animals‘ harms are combined to define 
―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ in preliminary relief analysis. Admittedly, requiring 
courts to include analysis of the humans‘ harm will add little to the 
plaintiffs‘ scale, as the animals‘ harm will be very strong on its own; but, 
at least in theory, this approach would not illogically disregard the human 
plaintiffs‘ interests after requiring them to pass a substantially difficult 
hurdle in establishing personal injury-in-fact for constitutional standing. 
This proposal avoids the controversy of animal standing,
144
 while at the 
same time upholding congressional intent and public policy to protect 
species from extinction.
145
  
 
 
 139. At least one district court has analyzed animal harm under the public interest factor of the 
preliminary injunction test. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1141 
(N.D. Cal. 2003).  
 140. 27 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 141. 281 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 142. Id. at 219–20 (considering the injury to human plaintiffs‘ ―ability to view, interact with, 
study, and appreciate mute swans‖); Clark, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 14–15 (considering a preliminary 
injunction to prevent an organized hunt of local bison and granting the human plaintiffs‘ preliminary 
injunction even though it only considered the humans‘ harm). 
 143.  
[E]quitable balancing empowers, if not requires, courts to discount those interests. As applied 
in Winter, equitable balancing only takes into account the interests of the particular parties, 
weighing the interests of the plaintiffs in receiving an injunction against the interests of the 
defendants in not being enjoined. Environmental harm carries no weight independent of its 
effects on the parties. The potential harm to whales factors into the balance of equities only to 
the extent that harm to whales might deprive the plaintiffs of opportunities to go whale 
watching and make nature documentaries. 
Goldstein, supra note 66, at 531 (lamenting the disregard of environmental harm in equitable 
balancing). 
 144. See supra notes 35, 44. 
 145. See supra note 137. 
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This approach is perhaps the closest to the standard adopted by the 
majority of courts, though none have clearly articulated it. The First and 
Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have employed this option, as have 
various district courts.
146
 However, these courts tend to ignore the human 
plaintiffs‘ harm altogether because it is usually comparatively trivial and 
adds little to the plaintiffs‘ scale.147 Their approach is better described as a 
human-only standing, animal-only harm approach; but for the reasons 
stated above, it would be more desirable to include human harm in the 
equitable relief analysis, as well. 
C. Approach Three: Animal Standing, Animal Harm Analysis 
The third approach requires a dramatic shift in the standing doctrine to 
allow animals standing to sue. While recognizing the aforementioned 
objections to and difficulty of implementing animal standing,
148
 granting 
animal standing would obviate pretense; a concerned pro-environment 
organization need not search for a member with some strong personal or 
professional connection to the threatened wildlife in order to meet 
constitutional standing requirements.
149
 Under these standing rules, courts 
would consider only the animal harm as ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ in the test for 
preliminary injunctions because the animal or species would be the only 
plaintiff. This approach encourages courts to pinpoint the primary purpose 
for civil environmental protection litigation, namely, to prevent harm or 
destruction to wildlife. 
A few courts have used this option, despite its seeming irreconcilability 
with the principles of the standing doctrine in environmental cases.
150
 
 
 
 146. See Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256–58 (10th Cir. 2003); 
Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 951–53 (1st Cir. 1983); Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Gates, 546 F. 
Supp. 2d 960, 983 (D. Haw. 2008). The Ocean Mammal court explicitly stated that the plaintiffs‘ harm 
included the harm to wildlife: ―This Court is obligated to consider the balance of the hardships on the 
parties. . . . The Court has already discussed what harm will come to the interests represented by 
Plaintiffs, i.e. marine mammals and Hawai‛i‘s ocean environment, should no injunction issue . . . .‖ 
Ocean Mammal Inst., 546 F. Supp. 2d at 983 (citation omitted). 
 147. However, in Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1209–10 (E.D. Cal. 2010), 
the court discussed the lack of irreparable injury to both the humans and the forest, though it did not 
suggest that harm to both was required or even distinct. 
 148. See supra notes 35, 38–47 and accompanying text. 
 149. ―The disconnect is obvious: harm to endangered species, which is the harm Congress sought 
to prevent in passing the ESA, did not create an incidental injury to a human person, so the 
[organization] could not enforce the substantive provisions of the ESA via citizen suit.‖ Carter, supra 
note 43, at 2206. 
 150. See supra note 66 (providing examples of cases). For example, the Palila court colorfully 
ruled:  
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However, these decisions may be distinguished because the defendants 
there did not challenge the animals‘ standing in the first instance.151 
D. Choosing an Approach 
Each of the three approaches has advantages and disadvantages. Under 
the current human-only standing regime, the most logical definition of 
―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ for preliminary injunction analysis is limiting it to 
human harm only (Approach One). The approach that is most favorable to 
environmental protection is that which grants animal standing and defines 
plaintiffs‘ harm as animal harm (Approach Three). However, recognizing 
that majoritarian support for animal standing is highly unlikely in the near 
future, the best standard may be a compromise under the second approach, 
whereby the standing doctrine remains untouched, but human and animal 
harm are amalgamated to define ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ within the preliminary 
injunction test. Adopting this second approach would also be consistent 
with the analysis conducted by the majority of courts. Furthermore, the 
second approach would provide protection to endangered species, as 
mandated by Congress and the public through the ESA, NEPA, and other 
wildlife protection statutes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Environmental protection litigation imposes special challenges. The 
standing doctrine creates strict barriers for many wishing to speak on 
behalf of wildlife and natural resources. Even once the standing barrier is 
 
 
As an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act . . . the bird (Loxioides bailleui), 
a member of the Hawaiian honeycreeper family, also has legal status and wings its way into 
federal court as a plaintiff in its own right. The Palila (which has earned the right to be 
capitalized since it is a party to this proceeding) is represented by attorneys for the Sierra 
Club, Audubon Society, and other environmental parties who obtained an order directing the 
Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources . . . to remove mouflon sheep from its 
critical habitat. 
Palila v. Haw. Dep‘t of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 151.  
[I]n Palila, the defendants did not challenge the propriety of having an animal as a named 
plaintiff. Similarly, animal species have remained named plaintiffs in other cases in which the 
defendants did not contest the issue.  
 However, in the only reported case in which the naming of an animal as a party was 
challenged, the court found that the animal did not have standing to bring suit. 
Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New Eng. Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. 
Mass. 1993) (citations omitted) (contrasting Palila with Hawaiian Crow (‗Alala) v. Lujan, 906 F. 
Supp. 549 (D. Haw. 1991)); see also Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(observing that the portion of the Palila decision stating that animals could be plaintiffs is dictum). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/5
  
 
 
 
 
2010] THE SCOPE OF ―PLAINTIFFS‘ HARM‖ 533 
 
 
 
 
broken, litigants face another difficult hurdle in obtaining preliminary 
injunctions. In determining whether to award temporary equitable relief, 
courts consider the harm to both parties but question how to define the 
scope of ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖—is it the harm to the human plaintiff with 
standing, the harm to the animals who are the objects of the litigation, or 
the harm to both? A significant problem with the Winter decision was its 
failure to explicitly identify the various harms that should be encompassed 
within the scope of ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ and its tacit adoption of the minority 
standard despite not ruling on the merits. While congressional intent and 
wildlife preservation policies support the consideration of animal harm 
within preliminary injunction analysis, it is essential that the Court choose 
one standard. Without a clear rule, both parties to environmental litigation 
are unable to properly prepare for the hurdles they will meet. Furthermore, 
without boundaries as to the scope of the threatened interests that courts 
may consider in preliminary injunction analysis, courts may, however 
unwittingly, choose a definition of ―plaintiffs‘ harm‖ merely because it 
leads to a desired result, whether that be pro-environment or pro-
defendant. 
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